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SUSTAINABLE BALANCE OF TRADE DEFICITS 
Eric O'N. FISHER* 
Cornell University, Ithaca, NY 14853-7601, USA 
This paper analyzes a model of overlapping generations in which there are two currencies. There 
are two agents born in each period, and these agents have completely heterogeneous preferences 
and endowments. The paper shows that there are monetaly equilibria in which one country can 
sustain a trade deficit whose present value is arbitrarily close to that of its trading partner's 
entire stream of resources. Hence, there may be no limit to the present value of a country's trade 
deficit, even if the equilibrium for the world economy satisfies an intertemporal efficiency 
criterion. 
1. Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is to show that monetary policies can give rise to 
arbitrarily large imbalances of trade in models of overlapping generations. In 
these models, when one agent is born in each period, a monetary policy has 
real economic effects through the intergenerational transfers that it facili­
tates. In international economics, it is natural to consider models in which 
there are several agents in each generation. Hence, it is possible for mone­
tary policies to give rise to both intergenerational and intragenerational 
transfers of resources. If we identify sequences of agents with countries, then 
the net transfers between them are trade surpluses or deficits. We show 
below that, for any specification of the sequences of endowments and 
preferences, any trade profile is consistent with some (world) monetary 
policy. In essence, no matter what the savings preferences and endowments 
of different countries are, monetmy policies alone can have arbitrarily large 
real international effects. 
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Analytic Economics at Cornell University for its support. Any errors are due to my own muddy 
thinking. 
II n t e r n a t i o n a l  e c o n o m i s t s  h a v e  k n o w n  t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  g e n e r a l  e q u i l i b r i a  i n  
r n a  
w h i c h  t h e r e  a r e  i m b a l a n c e s  o f  t r a d e  s i n c e  D a v i d  G a l e ' s  ( 1 9 7 1 )  i m p o r t a n t  
t h a  
c o n t r i b u t i o n .  I n d e e d ,  G a l e  n o t e d  t h a t  d y n a m i c  g e n e r a l  e q u i l i b r i u m  m o d e l s  
p o l
w i t h  h e t e r o g e n e o u s  a g e n t s  i n  w h i c h  t h e r e  i s  b a l a n c e d  t r a d e  a r e  t h e  e x c e p t i o n  
1  
r a t h e r  t h a n  t h e  r u l e .  I n  G a l e ' s  m o d e l ,  a g e n t s  a c c u m u l a t e  r e a l  p h y s i c a l  c a p i t a l  
a  s  
a s  a  s t o r e  o f  v a l u e ;  t e c h n o l o g i e s  a r e  i d e n t i c a l  a c r o s s  c o u n t r i e s  a n d  t r a d e  
S e c  
i m b a l a n c e s  a r i s e  b e c a u s e  o f  d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  s a v i n g s  r a t e s .  A l t h o u g h  t h e r e  w a s  
m o ,  
n o  f i n a n c i a l  a s s e t  i n  h i s  m o d e l ,  G a l e  c o n j e c t u r e d  t h a t  m o n e t a r y  p o l i c i e s  
h e t  
m i g h t  b e  a  s o u r c e  o f  i m b a l a n c e s  o f  t r a d e .  T h i s  p a p e r  e x t e n d s  G a l e ' s  r e s u l t  b y  
t h e  
d e s c r i b i n g  e x c h a n g e  e c o n o m i e s  i n  w h i c h  f i n a n c i a l  a s s e t s ,  n o t  p h y s i c a l  c a p i t a l ,  
s e r v e  a s  s t o r e s  o f  v a l u e .  T h e s e  e c o n o m i e s  a r e  c o m p l e t e l y  h e t e r o g e n e o u s ;  
2 .  1
p r e f e r e n c e s ,  e n d o w m e n t s ,  a n d  m o n e t a r y  p o l i c i e s  a r e  e n t i r e l y  g e n e r a l ,  a n d  w e  
d o  n o t  c o n f i n e  o u r  a t t e n t i o n  t o  s t e a d y  s t a t e s .  
I J  
S o m e  e c o n o m i s t s  o b j e c t  t o  t h e  r o l e  m o n e y  p l a y s  i n  m o d e l s  o f  o v e r l a p p i n g  
t w o  
g e n e r a t i o n s ;  t h e y  a r g u e  t h a t  t h e s e  m o d e l s  a r e  m o r e  d e s c r i p t i o n s  o f  s o c i a l  
t o  ~ 
s e c u r i t y  s c h e m e s  t h a n  t h e y  a r e  m o d e l s  o f  m o n e y . !  W e  f e e l ,  h o w e v e r ,  t h a t  
t h a 1  
t h e s e  c r i t i c i s m s  a r e  m u c h  l e s s  v a l i d  i n  m o d e l s  o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  f i n a n c e .  
e c o :  
B a l a n c e - o f - p a y m e n t s  a c c o u n t i n g  s e r v e s  a s  a  t e d i o u s  r e m i n d e r  t h a t  a  c u r r e n t  
t e n c  
a c c o u n t  d e f i c i t  i s  s i m p l y  t h e  s u m  o f  t h e  c a p i t a l  a c c o u n t  s u r p l u s  a n d  t h e  l o s s  o f  
s t r o  
o f f i c i a l  r e s e r v e s .  U n d e r  a  r e g i m e  o f  f l e x i b l e  e x c h a n g e  r a t e s ,  t h e  c h a n g e  i n  
I I  
o f f i c i a l  r e s e r v e s  i s  n e g l i g i b l e .  H e n c e ,  t h e  m o d e r n  a p p r o a c h  t o  m o d e l i n g  
o n e  
e x t e r n a l  d i s e q u i l i b r i a  f o c u s e s  u p o n  t h e  f o r c e s  i n f l u e n c i n g  t h e  a d j u s t m e n t  o f  
a S S l  
a n  e c o n o m y ' s  s t o c k  o f  n e t  f o r e i g n  a s s e t s .  
e n d  
T h i s  i s  o f  c o u r s e  e x a c t l y  t h e  w a y  i n  w h i c h  c l o s e d - e c o n o m y  m o d e l s  o f  
b e g i
o v e r l a p p i n g  g e n e r a t i o n s  d e a l  w i t h  t h e  d y n a m i c  p a t t e r n  o f  a s s e t  a c c u m u l a t i o n .  
e a c l  
T h e  a n a l y s i s  i n  o p e n  e c o n o m i e s  b e c o m e s  s l i g h t l y  m o r e  s u b t l e  b e c a u s e  i n t e r -
A l p .
n a t i o n a l  a n d  i n t e r g e n e r a t i o n a l  t r a d e s  o c c u r  i n  e a c h  p e r i o d .  W e  c a n  s e e  t h e n  
i s s U i  
t h a t  m o d e l s  o f  o v e r l a p p i n g  g e n e r a t i o n s  i n  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  f i n a n c e  a r e  r e a l l y  
a r e  
m o d e l s  o f  t h e  c a p i t a l  a c c o u n t ;  b y  f o c u s i n g  o n  t h e  a c c u m u l a t i o n  o f  f i n a n c i a l  
g O a l
a s s e t s ,  o n e  c a n  i n f e r  t r a d e  p a t t e r n s  f o r  a n  e c o n o m y .  
\ \  
S e v e r a l  a u t h o r s  h a v e  e x p l o r e d  m o d e l s  o f  o v e r l a p p i n g  g e n e r a t i o n s  i n  i n t e r -
w a r ]  
n a t i o n a l  e c o n o m i c s .  T h e  w o r k  o f  K a r e k e n  a n d  W a l l a c e  ( 1 9 8 1 )  i s  s e m i n a l ;  
b o r r  
t h e y  s h o w e d  t h a t  t h e  e q u i l i b r i u m  l e v e l  o f  t h e  e x c h a n g e  r a t e  i s  i n d e t e r m i n a t e .  
i f  h  
T h e i r  m o d e l  h a s  o n e  g o o d  p e r  p e r i o d  a n d  u s e s  s t a t i o n a r y  p r e f e r e n c e s ,  
t h a t  
e n d o w m e n t s ,  a n d  m o n e y - s u p p l y  p r o c e s s e s .  B u i t e r  ( 1 9 8 1 )  s t u d i e s  a  o n e - s e c t o r  
a n d  
g r o w t h  m o d e l  i n  w h i c h  c o u n t r i e s  h a v e  d i f f e r e n t  r a t e s  o f  t i m e  p r e f e r e n c e ,  a n d  
y o u t
S i b e r t  ( 1 9 8 5 )  a n a l y z e s  c o u n t r y - s p e c i f i c  t a x  p o l i c i e s  i n  a  s i m i l a r  m o d e l .  N e i t h e r  
o f  g J
o f  t h e s e  m o d e l s  u s e s  f i n a n c i a l  a s s e t s  e x p l i c i t l y .  O u r  w o r k  f o c u s e d  u p o n  t h e  
T J  
m o n e y - s u p p l y  p r o c e s s e s  a s  t h e  d e t e r m i n a n t  o f  t r a d e  p a t t e r n s ;  t h e  c e n t r a l  
u "  =  
q u e s t i o n  w e  a d d r e s s  i s  w h a t  k i n d s  o f  t r a d e  i m b a l a n c e s  c a n  b e  s u s t a i n e d  b y  
w h e ]   
c o m l   
l S e e  T o b i n ' s  ( 1 9 8 0 )  d i s c u s s i o n  i n  K a r e k e n  a n d  W a l l a c e  ( e d i t o r s ) ,  M o d e l s  o f  M o n e t a r y  
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-monetary policies in which the exchange rate is well defined. We show below 
that almost any trade deficit can be sustained by the appropriate monetary 
policies. 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. The second section presents 
a sharply focused example to illustrate the main results of this research. 
Section 3 presents a general model in which there are two moneys; in this 
model, there are finitely many commodities in each period and agents have 
heterogeneous endowments and preferences. The fourth section establishes 
the main result, and section 5 is a brief conclusion. 
2. An example of monetary policy as a source of trade imbalance 
In order to whet the reader's appetite for the general analysis in the next 
two sections, we present a simple example of a monetary policy that gives rise 
to an infinitely large trade deficit. An important feature of this example is 
that the monetary policy we describe makes every agent in the world 
economy better off than in the nonmonetary equilibrium. Hence, the exis­
tence of this world monetary policy and its concomitant trade imbalance is a 
strong Pareto improvement over the autarkic allocations. 
In order to keep the example tractable, we shall assume that there is only 
one commodity per period; this commodity cannot be stored. We shall 
assume further that there are two sequences of agents whose preferences and 
endowments are identical in every respect. There are two old agents at the 
beginning of time; otherwise, there are two agents born in each period and 
each agent lives for two periods. Let us call the first sequence of agents 
Alphas and the second such sequence Betas. The government of the Alphas 
issues red money and the government of the Betas issues blue money. There 
are no restrictions placed on the agents participating in the markets for 
goods, red money or blue money. 
We describe now the endowments and preferences of the agents in the 
world economy. It is convenient to write Gt = {at> f3t}; this is the set of people 
born in generation t. The endowments of agent h are given by W;, = (1 + y)1 
if h E Go, and Wh = (3(1 + y)1), (1 + y)1) if h E Gp with t ~ 1. This states 
that the generation 0 people have one unit of the commodity in their dotage 
and that the members of any other generation have 3(1 + y)t units in their 
youth and (1 + y)1 in their dotage. The parameter y > 0 is the per capita rate 
of growth of the world economy. 
The preferences for these agents are summarized by the utility functions 
uh = log CI~ if hE Go, and u;, = ~log Cit + ~log ci,+ I if hE Go with t ~ 1, 
where we are using the convention that a superscript refers to a dated 
commodity and that a subscript refers to an agent. 
Now let us consider two very simple monetary policies. The monetary 
policy of the Alpha government consists of giving 2(1 + y)/(2 + y) units of 
r e d  m o n e y  t o  M s .  a
o  
a n d  g i v i n g  4 y ( 1  +  Y Y / ( 2  +  y )  u n i t s  o f  r e d  m o n e y  t o  t h e  
o l d  A l p h a  o f  g e n e r a t i o n  t  ~ 1 .  T h e  m o n e t a r y  p o l i c y  o f  t h e  B e t a  g o v e r n m e n t  
i s  l e s s  e x p a n s i o n a r y .  I t  e n t a i l s  g i v i n g  2 ( 1  +  y ) / ( 2  +  y )  u n i t s  o f  b l u e  m o n e y  t o  
M s .  1 3 0  a n d  n o t h i n g  t o  a n y o n e  e l s e .  
A s  w e  s h o w  b e l o w ,  t h e  e x c h a n g e  r a t e  i s  c o n s t a n t  i n  a  p e r f e c t - f o r e s i g h t  
e q u i l i b r i u m .  N o w  l e t  t h e  e x c h a n g e  r a t e  b e  o n e .  W i t h o u t  l o s s  o f  g e n e r a l i t y ,  l e t  
t h e  p r i c e  o f  t h e  c o n s u m p t i o n  g o o d  a t  t i m e  o n e  b e  g i v e n  b y  p I  =  1 ;  f u r t h e r  l e t  
t h e  p r i c e  o f  r e d  m o n e y  a t  t i m e  1  b e  o n e .  T h e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  m o n e t a r y  p o l i c y  
( / - L ,  v )  i s  s u c h  t h a t  t h e  w o r l d  s u p p l y  o f  r e a l  b a l a n c e s  k e e p s  g o o d s  p r i c e s  
s t a t i o n a r y .  U s i n g  a  f i r s t - o r d e r  d i f f e r e n c e  e q u a t i o n ,  i t  i s  p o s s i b l e  t o  c h e c k  t h a t  
t h e  g o o d s  p r i c e  s e q u e n c e  p  =  ( 1 ,  1 ,  . . .  )  i s  i n d e e d  a n  e q u i l i b r i u m .  
T h e  A l p h a s '  e q u i l i b r i u m  a l l o c a t i o n s  a r e  1  +  / - L o  f o r  M s .  a
o  
a n d  ( 2 ( 1  +  Y Y +  
/ - L [ / 2 ,  2 ( 1  +  y  Y +  / - L / / 2 )  f o r  M s .  a  
p  
w i t h  t  ~ 1 .  T h e  e q u i l i b r i u m  a l l o c a t i o n s  o f  
t h e  B e t a s  a r e  1  +  V
o  
f o r  M s .  f 3  
0  
a n d  ( 2 ( 1  +  y ) / ,  2 ( 1  +  y ) f )  f o r  M s .  f 3 1 '  w i t h  
t  ~ 1 .  N o t e  t h a t  t h e s e  a l l o c a t i o n s  P a r e t o  d o m i n a t e  t h o s e  i n  t h e  n o n m o n e t a r y  
e q u i l i b r i u m .  T h i s  i s  t r u e  e v e n  f o r  t h e  a l t e r  g e n e r a t i o n s  o f  t h e  B e t a s ;  i n d e e d ,  
t h e y  a r e  a b l e  t o  u s e  r e d  m o n e y  a s  a  s t o r e  o f  v a l u e  i n  o r d e r  t o  s m o o t h  
c o n s u m p t i o n  b e t w e e n  y o u t h  a n d  o l d  a g e .  N o t e  f u r t h e r  t h a t  t h e  A l p h a s  
c o n s u m e  m o r e  t h a n  h a l f  t h e  w o r l d  e n d o w m e n t  o f  g o o d s  i n  e v e r y  p e r i o d .  
B e c a u s e  t h e  p r e s e n t - v a l u e  p r i c e s
2  
a r e  c o n s t a n t ,  t h i s  i s ,  i n  r e a l  t e r m s ,  a n  
i n f i n i t e  t r a d e  d e f i c i t .  
T h e  i n t u i t i o n  b e h i n d  t h i s  s u r p r i s i n g  e x a m p l e  i s  t h a t  a  g r o w i n g  w o r l d  
e c o n o m y  n e e d s  a n  i n c r e a s i n g  s u p p l y  o f  r e a l  b a l a n c e s .  S i n c e  m o n e y  s e r v e s  a s  a  
s t o r e  o f  v a l u e ,  t h e r e  a r e  w o r l d  m o n e t a r y  p o l i c i e s  t h a t  g i v e  r i s e  t o  e q u i l i b r i a  
w h o s e  a l l o c a t i o n s  a r e  s t r o n g l y  P a r e t o - s u p e r i o r  t o  t h o s e  i n  a  n o n m o n e t a r y  
e q u i l i b r i u m .  I f  o n e  c o u n t r y  g i v e s  i t s  c i t i z e n s  m o n e y ,  t h e n  i t  i s  g i v i n g  t h e m  
s e i g n i o r a g e .  S i n c e  t h e r e  a r e  a b s o l u t e l y  n o  r e s t r i c t i o n s  o n  g o o d s  m a r k e t s  o r  
f i n a n c i a l  m a r k e t s ,  a g e n t s  w h o  d e s i r e  t o  a c c u m u l a t e  r e a l  b a l a n c e s  t h a t  s e l v e  a s  
s t o r e s  o f  v a l u e  m a y  d o  s o .  T h e  A l p h a s  h a v e  m o r e  m o n e y  ( o f  b o t h  k i n d s )  t h a n  
t h e y  n e e d ,  b u t  t h e  B e t a s  d o  n o t  h a v e  e n o u g h .  H e n c e ,  t h e  B e t a s  t r a d e  r e a l  
g o o d s  f o r  f i n a n c i a l  a s s e t s .  W e  h a v e  c o n s t r u c t e d  t h e  w o r l d  m o n e t a r y  p o l i c y  s o  
t h a t  t h e  l a t t e r - d a y  A l p h a s  a l w a y s  d i s - s a v e  a n d  t h e i r  l a t t e r - d a y  B e t a  b r e t h r e n  
a l w a y s  a c q u i r e  r e d  m o n e y  a s  a  s t o r e  o f  v a l u e .  
T h e  r e a d e r  m a y  b e  i n t e r e s t e d  i n  h o w  t h e  a n a l y s i s  i n  t h i s  p a p e r  e x t e n d s  t o  
m o d e l s  o f  o v e r l a p p i n g  g e n e r a t i o n s  l i k e  t h o s e  i n  B l a n c h a r d  a n d  F i s c h e r ' s  
i n f l u e n t i a l  t e x t  ( 1 9 8 9 ) .  T h e y  a n a l y z e  p r o d u c t i o n  e c o n o m i e s  i n  w h i c h  p h y s i c a l  
c a p i t a l  s e r v e s  a s  a  s t o r e  o f  v a l u e  a n d  t h e  n u m b e r  o f  a g e n t s  ( a n d  h e n c e  t h e  
l a b o r  s u p p l y )  i s  i n c r e a s i n g  g e o m e t r i c a l l y .  B l a n c h a r d  a n d  F i s c h e r  a s s u m e  t h a t  
a g e n t s  h a v e  s e p a r a b l e  p r e f e r e n c e s ,  a n d  t h e i r  a n a l y s i s  f o c u s e s  u p o n  s t a t i o n a r y  
m o d e l s ,  a l t h o u g h  t h e y  d o  a n a l y z e  n o n s t a t i o n a r y  e q u i l i b r i a .  T h e y  n o t e  t h a t  
m o n e t a r y  e q u i l i b r i a  c a n  o c c u r  o n l y  w h e n  t h e  r a t e  o f  r e t u r n  o f  m o n e y  i s  n o t  
2  I t  i s  h e l p f u l  t o  t h i n k  o f  t h e s e  a s  t h e  ' t i m e  l '  p r i c c s  o f  c o m m o d i t i e s  s i n c e  w e  h a v e  u s e d  t h e  
n o r m a l i z a t i o n  t h a t  p r i c e  o f  c o n s u m p t i o n  g o o d  i n  t h e  f i r s t  p e r i o d  i s  o n e .  
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he dominated by that of physical capital. As will become clear in the analysis 
nt below, in an international monetary equilibrium it is necessary that the rates 
to of return of all moneys be equal and that this rate of return be no less than 
that on real economic investment in any country. 
ht It is worth mentioning that the analysis of a production economy with an 
et increasing labor supply is no more general than that below, because an 
ct arbitrary sequence of endowments in an exchange economy can always be 
cy interpreted as per capita endowments after the production activity has taken 
cs place. Finally, our assumption that preferences are completely heterogeneous 
at is more general than that used in Blanchard and Fischer. 
With all this said, the reader may feel that there is something special about 
+. the example above, but this is not so. In the next two sections, we show that 
)f for any sequence of endowments and preferences in the world economy, 
h virtually any trade pattern can be implemented by some world monetary 
'Y policy. We hope that this hoI's d'oeuvre has fortified the reader for the larger 
.1, course that lies ahead. 
h 
:s 3. The model and equilibrium I. 
n The model is a simple extension of that developed by Balasko and Shell 
(1981)3 in their fundamental paper. In that paper, Balasko and Shell analyze 
:I an economy in which there is one agent born in each period. Each agent lives 
il for two periods, and there is one agent who is 'old' at the beginning of the 
model. Goods cannot be stored, and this gives rise to a role of money as a 
'! store of value. The agents have heterogeneous preferences and endowments, 
and there are [ goods available at each point in time. Each agent has 
, preferences such that the closure of her indifference surfaces are contained 
I
~. in the positive orthant of [-dimensional or 2[-dimensional Euclidean space. 
Further, each agent is endowed with strictly positive amounts of every good 
in each period of her life, and the agents are subject to monetary taxes and 
transfers that are imposed by a central authority. 
We extend this model by assuming that there are two agents born in each 
period, with each agent living for two periods.4 There are two people who 
are old at the beginning of the economy, and they live for only one period. 
During each period of time, there is a finite number of commodities; these 
commodities are perishable and cannot be stored. This implies that there 
may be a role for financial assets as stores of value. We assume that there are 




r'~ 3We cite two different papers by these authors. Unless otherwise noted, we always refer
 
implicitly to Balasko and Shell (]98l).I'
f 
4Nothing in this analysis depends upon there being only two agents born in each period; this is 
simply an analytical convenience. Nor does it matter that there are only two moneys or two 
countries. Indeed, when it suits us below, we shall mention obvious extensions of this model to 
the case of finitely many agents per period and finitely many fiat moneys. f
~ 
I t  w i l l  b e  c o n v e n i e n t  t o  r e p r e s e n t  c o m m o d i t y  b u n d l e s ,  p r i c e s ,  a n d  g o v e r n ­
m e n t  p o l i c i e s  a s  s e q u e n c e s .  T h e  s p a c e  o f  a l l o c a t i o n s  i s  X  =  (IR~+ X  IR~+) X  
(
1 R  
2 1  
X  1 R  
2 1  
)  X  ( 1 R  
2 1  
X  !I~21 )  X  .  .  .  a n d  t h e  w o r l d  e c o n o m y ' s  s e q u e n c e  o f
+ + + +  + + + +  ,  
e n d o w m e n t s  i s  a n  e l e m e n t  w  E  X ,  I t  w i l l  b e  c o n v e n i e n t  t o  d e n o t e  t h e  s e t  o f  
p e o p l e  b o r n  a t  t i m e  t  b y  G / ;  w e  s h a l l  t h i n k  o f  t h e  t w o  e l e m e n t s  o f  t h i s  s e t  a s  
b e i n g  a n  A l p h a  p e r s o n  a n d  a  B e t a  p e r s o n ,  b o t h  o f  g e n e r a t i o n  t .  L e t  
G o  =  { a o ,  l 3 o }  d e n o t e  t h e  t w o  o l d  p e o p l e  a l i v e  a t  t h e  b e g i n n i n g  o f  t h e  
e c o n o m y .  T h e n  G  =  ( G o ,  G
1
,  . • •  )  r e p r e s e n t s  t h e  w o r l d  e c o n o m y ' s  d e m o ­
g r a p h i c  s t r u c t u r e .  
I n  t h e s e  m o d e l s ,  t h e r e  i s  n o  s h a r p  d i s t i n c t i o n  b e t w e e n  m o n e t a r y  a n d  f i s c a l  
p o l i c i e s .  I t  i s  c o n v e n i e n t  t o  c a l l  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t s '  p o l i c y  t o o l s  l u m p - s u m  t a x  
t r a n s f e r s .  I n  a  m o d e l  i n  w h i c h  t h e r e  i s  o n e  g o v e r n m e n t ,  s u c h  a  p o l i c y  i s  a  
s e q u e n c e  o f  m o n e t a r y  t a x e s  a n d  t r a n s f e r s  t h a t  a r e  i m p o s e d  u p o n  t h e  a g e n t s  
i n  t h e  d i f f e r e n t  p e r i o d s  o f  t h e i r  l i v e s .  I n  a  s e t t i n g  i n  w h i c h  t h e r e  i s  m o r e  t h a n  
o n e  g o v e r n m e n t ,  t h e  d e s c r i p t i o n  o f  l u m p - s u m  m o n e y  t r a n s f e r s  i s  m o r e  
c o m p l i c a t e d  t h a n  t h e  u s u a l  c a s e .  F o r  a n y o n e  o l d  a t  t h e  b e g i n n i n g  o f  t h e  
e c o n o m y ,  w e  h a v e  h E  G o ,  a n d  a  m o n e y  t r a n s f e r  i s  g i v e n  a s  ( m J "  n J , )  E  1 R
2  
w i t h  t h e  f i r s t  e l e m e n t  o f  t h i s  t w o - t u p l e  b e i n g  i n t e r p r e t e d  a s  m - m o n e y  r e c e i p t s  
a n d  t h e  s e c o n d  e l e m e n t  a s  n - m o n e y  r e c e i p t s .  F o r  a n y  o t h e r  a g e n t  h  E  G
t  
w i t h  t  ~ 1  w e  h a v e  ( m ; "  n ; "  m ; , +  1 ,  n ; , +  I )  E  [~4 a s  h e r  l u m p - s u m  t a x  t r a n s f e r s .  
L e t  m E  M  b e  a  s e q u e n c e  w h o s e  t y p i c a l  e l e m e n t  i s  a  m o n e y  t r a n s f e r ,  w h e r e  
M  i s  t h e  s e t  o f  f e a s i b l e  l u m p - s u m  m o n e y  t r a n s f e r s .  M  c a n  b e  i d e n t i f i e d  w i t h  
( 1 R  
2  
X  1 R  
2
)  X  ( 1 R  
4  
X  1 R  
4  
)  X  ( 1 R  
4  
X  1 R  
4  
)  X  . . .  ,  w h e r e  w e  h a v e  t a k e n  c a r e  a g a i n  t o  
r e s t a t e  t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  t w o  a g e n t s  b o r n  i n  e a c h  p e r i o d .  N o t i c e  t h a t  w e  h a v e  
a l r e a d y  a d o p t e d  a n  i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s t  p e r s p e c t i v e  b e c a u s e  w e  a r e  c o n s i d e r i n g  
b o t h  m - m o n e y  a n d  n - m o n e y  m o n e t a r y  p o l i c i e s  i n  t h i s  d e s c r i p t i o n .  
T h e  a g e n t s  i n  t h e  w o r l d  e c o n o m y  a r e  f r e e  t o  h o l d  o r  c r e a t e  a s  m u c h  i n s i d e  
m o n e y ,  o f  e i t h e r  d e n o m i n a t i o n ,  a s  t h e y  p l e a s e .  L e t  x i ; ' "  a n d  x i ;  1 1  b e  t h e  g r o s s  
a d d i t i o n s ,  a t  t i m e  t ,  t o  M s .  h ' s  h o l d i n g s  o f  m - m o n e y  a n d  n - m o n e y ,  r e s p e c ­
t i v e l y .  W e  i m p o s e  t h a t  
xkm~o a n d  xh,Il~O 
f o r  h E  G o ,  
x i " m  + X i , + I , , "  ~ 0  a n d  x h , 1 l  + X ; , · I ' l , 1 l  ~ 0  
f o r  h E  G / ,  
( 1 )  
w i t h  t  ~ 1 ,  
w h i c h  h a s  t h e  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  t h a t  n o  o n e  c a n  d i e  a s  a  n e t  d e b t o r  i n  e i t h e r  
c u r r e n c y  a n d  w h e r e  w e  h a v e  i m p o s e d  t h e  i m p l i c i t  c o n s t r a i n t  t h a t  n o  o n e  
h o l d s  m o n e y  w h e n  s h e  i s  n o t  a l i v e , S  W e  r e s t r i c t  o u r  a t t e n t i o n  a s  u s u a l  t o  
5 A g a i n ,  w e  a r e  u s i n g  t h e  c o n v e n t i o n  t h a t  a  s u b s c r i p t  i s  t h e  i n d e x  o f  a n  a g e n t  a n d  a  s u p e r s c r i p t  
i s  t h e  i n d e x  o f  a  d a t e d  c o m m o d i t y  o r  a  d a t e d  m o n e y .  N o t i c e  t h a t  a g e n t s  c a n  b o r r o w  o r  l e n d  
a r b i t r a r i l y  l a r g e  a m o u n t s  o f  e i t h e r  m o n e y  i n  t h e  f i r s t  p e r i o d  o f  t h e i r  l i v e s  a s  l o n g  a s  t h e y  d o  n o t  
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m­ perfectly-foreseen present-value commodity prices; let us call the set of such 
prices 9.6 
of The consumption choices of the agents satisfy: 
of 
.. (I)as maximize Uh X h , (2) 
,el 
subject tohe 





x}, ~ 0, x}"m ~ 0, x},·n ~ 0 forIn 
I'e and 
Ie 
,. (I 1+ I)!2 maximize U" x", x" ' 
Ls subject to 
,I, 
P I 'Xl +pl+1 'X,+I +pl,mxl,m +pl'''XI,fIs. 
" h " " 
'c 






xI,"n +x!,+ I,m ~ 0, 
for h E Gil with t ~ 1. 
Note that we have implicitly defined w" in these expressions; this is the 
present value of agent h's wealth, including the taxes and transfers that 
accrue to her during the course of her life. 
Let us define the aggregate supply of m-money and n-money in period t as 
I I 
l lm = L: L: m!; and n = L: L: nj" 
s=1 hEGsUG,_1 s=1 hEG,UG,_1 
6We adopt the normalization that the price of the consumption good 1 in period 1 is unity. 
Further, it is important to emphasize that there are many other equilibria in this model. They 
correspond to intrinsically uncertain realizations of the exchange rate process. An analysis of 
these equilibria is entirely beyond the scope of this paper. 
Iw h e r e  m
'  
E  I R  a n d  l i k e w i s e  n
l  
E  I R .  T h i s  a l l o w s  u s  t o  d e f i n e  a  m o n e t a r y  
L  
c o m p e t i t i v e  e q u i l i b r i u m  a s  a  s e q u e n c e  o f  c o m m o d i t y  p r i c e s  P E g ;  a n d  a  
p  
s e q u e n c e  o f  m o n e y  p r i c e s  ( p l , l I I , p l , n , p 2 , m , p 2 , n ,  . . .  )  s a t i s f y i n g  f o r  a l l  t  ~ 1 :  
I :  x I I  =  2 :  w i "  
p
h E G , U G ' _ l  h E G , U G / _  
1  
C J  
l
"  ( X
l
- , 1 I I  + x
"  
" ' )  + "  x l . m : s :  m  
l  





h E G /  p  
n  
"  ( X l - l , 1 l




, , , )  + "  
i . . . J h - '
X " n  <  n
'
i . . . J  
h E G , _ t  h E G /  
n  
w h e r e  x~·m =X)~,1l = = 0  f o r  h E  G o .  
t i  
T h i s  d e f i n i t i o n  a l l o w s  u s  t o  s t a t e  o u r  f i r s t  p r o p o s i t i o n :  
h i  
S i  
P r o p o s i t i o n  1 .  L e t  p  E  &  b e  a  g o o d s  p r i c e  s e q u e n c e  i n  a  m o n e t a r y  e q u i l i b r i u m  
n  
a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  w  E  X  a n d  t h e  i n t e m a t i o n a l  m o n e t a r y  p o l i c y  M .  T h e n  p I ,  1 1 1  a n d  
p l , 1 t  a r e  b o t h  n o n n e g a t i v e  c o n s t a n t s .  
P r o o f .  ( T h i s  i s  a n  e x t e n s i o n  o f  B a l a s k o  a n d  S h e l l ' s  P r o p o s i t i o n  3 . 1 . )  A s s u m e  
\ \
t h a t  t h e  p r i c e  o f  s o m e  m o n e y  i s  n o t  a  c o n s t a n t .  W i t h o u t  l o s s  o f  g e n e r a l i t y  l e t  
t h i s  b e  m - m o n e y .  T h e n ,  f o r  s o m e  t ,  p l . 1 I I  = l =  
p  
l + l , l 1 l .  T h e  b u d g e t  c o n s t r a i n t  f o r  
P I
c o n s u m e r  h  E  G 1 ( t  ~ 1 )  c a n  b e  w r i t t e n  a s  
r i t  
p i X !  + p l + 1
X  
I + l  
e ( j  
I h  
< p l W
l  




+ p l . m ( m
l  
- x " m )  + p l ' ' ' ( n
l  
- x l , n )
- h h h  h h  h h  












, l l )
I I  h " h '  
X / " m  +  x f , +  1 , 1 / l  : ? :  0 ,  X I , ' "  + x / , + I , n : ? :  O .  
a r
S i n c e  u , , ( ' )  i s  s t r i c t l y  i n c r e a s i n g ,  b y  s e t t i n g  X I , + I , m  =  - x h , m ,  c o n s u m e r  h  c a n  
c h o o s e  a n  a r b i t r a r i l y  l a r g e  c o n s u m p t i o n  p r o f i l e  ( x ! "  X / , +  1 )  E  IR~+. B u t  t h i s  
v i o l a t e s  t h e  m a t e r i a l  b a l a n c e s  c o n d i t i o n  
I
~ 
L :  X h  =  
2 :  w i , ·  
. .  
h e G j U G , _ 1  
! t E G , U G ' _ 1  
· · ! :  
1
L e t  u s  n o w  d e f i n e  a n  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  m o n e t a t y  c o m p e t i t i v e  e q u i l i b r i u m  a s  a  
m o n e t a r y  c o m p e t i t i v e  e q u i l i b r i u m  i n  w h i c h  p i l l  >  0  a n d  p "  >  O .  T h i s  e n a b l e s  
u s  t o  g i v e  a  n a t u r a l  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  t h e  e x c h a n g e  r a t e .  
l
"  
J . M  
. . , A  _  
letalY Definition. The exchange rate, measured in units of m-money necessary to
 




If e l + 1> e l , then m-money has depreciated in value. We may now state: 
Proposition 2. In an international monetary competitive equilibrium, the ex­
change rate is constant. 
Proof. This follows from Proposition 1 and the definition of the exchange
rate. • 
This result is entirely analogous to that of Kareken and Wallace (1981); 
they call it the dominance result. Kareken and Wallace adopt the normaliza­
tion that the price of the single consumption good is unity in each period; 
hence, their result can be interpreted that the real exchange rate is constant. 
Since we have used the normalization that p l, I is unity, our result states that 
iltm the present value of the real exchange rate is constant. 
lIlId In light of Proposition 2, we can use a more convenient notation. Define 
g= {(p,p/11,pfl)lp E.9, p"' > 0, and pn > O}. 
line 
We may now state: let 
for 
Proposition 3. Let q E Q define an international monetaly competitive equilib­
rium for endowments lJ.) E X and lump-sum money transfers m EM. Then the 
equilibrium goods allocations and money holdings satisfy 




lis pl. [ L Xf,] +pm[ L (Xf,·m+exfl'J1-m~,-enU] =pl. [ L: wJ,], 
hEG, hEG, hEG, 
• pl+l.[ L xf,+l]=_pm[ L: (x;,+l.m+ex;,+J.m_mJ,+l-enJ,+l)] 
hEGI hEG, 
a 
~s +p'+l. [ L Wf,+l] if hE GI' with t ~ 1. 
hEG, 
IP r o o f .  T h e s e  c o n d i t i o n s  f o l l o w  f r o m  t h e  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  t h e  e x c h a n g e  r a t e  a n d  
B a l a s k o  a n d  S h e l l ' s  P r o p o s i t i o n  3 . 4 .  . .  S l  
B  
P r o p o s i t i o n  4 .  L e t  q  E ! J }  d e f i n e  a n  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  m o n e t a r y  e q u i l i b r i u m  f o r  
e n d o w m e n t s  W  E  X  a n d  m o n e y  t r a n s f e r s  m  E M .  T h e n  
f  
e J  
( x } " I n , X h , I l ) = ( O , O )  i f  h E G
o  
e l  
a n d  
\ '  ( x  
t
' l I l  +  e x  
t




, , , )
~ h h  ~ I i  I i 
  
h E G ,  h E G , 
  
=  m '  +  e n
t  
i f  t  ~ 1 .  
p  
P r o o f .  S i n c e  w e  a r e  i n  a n  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  m o n e t a r y  c o m p e t i t i v e  e q u i l i b r i u m ,  
e t  
t h e  p r i c e  o f  m - m o n e y  i s  a  c o n s t a n t  p i n  >  0  a n d  t h e  e x c h a n g e  r a t e  i s  a  
e ;  
c o n s t a n t  e >  0 ,  T h e n  P r o p o s i t i o n  3  a n d  t h e  m o n o t o n y  o f  p r e f e r e n c e s  i m p l y  
n  
t h a t  (X/~,m, X h , l l )  =  ( 0 , 0 )  i f  h  E  G o ;  t h e s e  t w o  f a c t s  a l s o  i m p l y  t h e  f i r s t  e q u a l i t y  
i n  t h e  s e c o n d  l i n e  o f  t h e  p r o p o s i t i o n  a b o v e .  T h e  m o n e y  m a r k e t  e q u i l i b r i u m  
t h e n  i m p l i e s  t h e  t h i r d  e q u a l i t y .  . .  
w  
A
P r o p o s i t i o n  4  s t a t e s  t h a t  t h e  e n t i r e  w o r l d  m o n e y  s u p p l y  a t  t i m e  t  i s  h e l d  a s  
a  s t o r e  o f  v a l u e  b y  t h e  y o u n g  o f  g e n e r a t i o n  t  a n d  t h a t  i t  i s  d i s - s a v e d  i n  t h e  
s e c o n d  p e r i o d  o f  t h e i r  l i v e s .  W e  c a n  c a l l  t h e  e x p r e s s i o n  m '  +  e n '  t h e  m ­
I t
m o n e y  e q u i v a l e n t  o f  t h e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  m o n e y  s u p p l y .  N o t i c e  t h a t  t h i s  d e ­
t h
p e n d s  u p o n  t h e  v a l u e  o f  t h e  e x c h a n g e  r a t e  e .  
o f
R e c a l l  t h a t  t h e  s e q u e n c e  o f  a g e n t s  i n  t h e  w o r l d  e c o n o m y  i s  G  =  ( G
t  
) ,  
w h e r e  G ,  =  { a "  f 3 t }  f o r  t  ~ O .  W e  h a v e  a  n a t u r a l  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  n a t i o n a l i t y :  
v a  
m  
e ) (




b e  t h e  f i r s t  e l e m e n t  o f  G
t  
- I  a n d  l e t  a t  b e  t h e  f i r s t  e l e m e n t 
  
o f  G
f  




a n d  a g e n t  a t  a r e  o f  t h e  s a m e  n a t i o n a l i t y .  
t r : 
  
t h
T h e  s e q u e n c e  a  =  ( a D '  a I '  . . .  )  i s  i d e n t i f i e d  w i t h  t h e  p o p u l a t i o n  o f  t h e  
d e
A l p h a  c o u n t r y ,  a n d  t h e  s e q u e n c e  f 3  i s  a n a l o g o u s .  I t  i s  c o n v e n i e n t  t o  d e f i n e  
t h e  s e q u e n c e  o f  e n d o w m e n t s  o f  t h e  A l p h a  c o u n t r y  b y  w "  =  (w~o +  w~J' 
c o  
w~J +  W~2' • . .  )  a n d  t o  d e f i n e  w { 3  a n a l o g o u s l y .  T h e s e  s e q u e n c e s  r e p r e s e n t  t h e  
b e
e n t i r e  f l o w  o f  r e s o u r c e s  o f  t h e  A l p h a  c o u n t r y  a n d  t h e  B e t a  c o u n t r y ,  r e s p e c ­
t i v e l y .  
W I ' :  
a r ,  




a n d  a ,  b e  t h e  f i r s t  e l e m e n t  o f  
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nd This is well defined because only finitely many of the elements of the right 
• side of (3) are not zero. We define the time 1 value of the trade surplus of the Beta countly at time t exactly analogously as TB I • 
Proposition 5. Let q E!J} define an international monetary equilibrium for 
endowments w E X and lump-sum money transfers m E M. Let a1_ 1 be the first 
element of Gt - 1 and let at be the first element of Gr for t ;::: 1. Then 
(4) 
Proof. The trade surplus is given by pl. [W~, + W~'_I -x~J -X~'_I], which is 
equal to pl. [w~1-I -X~,_) +pt. [W~, -X~,]. This is simply the value of the 
excess supply goods in the Alpha country at time t. Proposition 3 implies that 
this is equal to 
where this is of course the value of the excess demand for money in the 
Alpha country at time t. • 
Eq. (4) has been called the monetary approach to the balance of payments.7 
It states that the trade surplus is given by the excess demand of at time t for 
the sum of m-money and n-money. This proposition is an important aspect 
of understanding when a trade deficit is sustainable. Notice that the present 
value of the trade surplus of the Alpha country depends upon the price of 
m-money. Consider lump-sum money transfers m EM that tend to create an 
excess supply of money for the Alpha population. Then these will be money 
transfer schemes that correspond to trade deficits. 
Let TA = (TA 1, TA 2, ... ), and let us call the sequence of trade surpluses of 
the Alpha country its trade profile. Again the present value of this profile 
depends upon the price of m-money. We define the trade profile of the Beta 
country exactly analogously. Note that TA = - TB in a two-country model. 
Let us now formalize the notion of an international monetary policy. We 
begin by writing II = (m' m l ) and II = (m l + m l + l m' + ml + 1) for t;::: l'ra "'0' 130 rl "" "I' 13, 13, , 
we defined 110 and 11, analogously. These expressions remind us again that we 
are dealing with two agents born in each period. Since the prices of both 
moneys are constant in an international monetary competitive equilibrium, 
we can actually identify a monetary policy with the present value of the sum 
of taxes and transfers that fall upon agent h. This allows us to define an 
7The classic references are Johnson (1961) and the International Monetary Fund's The 
Monetary Approach to the Balance of Payments (977). 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  m o n e t a r y  p o l i c y  a s  t w o  s e q u e n c e s  I - L  =  ( / - L o ,  / - L 1 '  . . .  )  a n d  v =  
( v  
o
,  v  l '  . . .  ) .  W e  s h a l l  c a l l  I - L  a n  A l p h a  c o u n t r y  m o n e t a r y  p o l i c y ;  l i k e w i s e  v  i s  
a  B e t a  c o u n t r y  m o n e t a r y  p o l i c y .  
W e  w i l l  b e  i n t e r e s t e d  i n  m o n e t a r y  p o l i c i e s  t h a t  d i s p l a y  a  s i m p l e  p r o p e r t y .  
T h e y  a r e  s u c h  t h a t  / - L a  =  (m~ , 0 ) ,  V
o  
=  ( 0 ,  n { 3 1  ) ,  a n d  / - L I  =  (m~ + m~+ 1 , 0 ) ,
o  0  ( t
V I  =  ( 0 ,  m~, + m~~ 1 )  f o r  t  ~ 1 .  W e  s h a l l  c a l l  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  m o n e t a r y  p o l i c i e s  o f  
t h i s  f o r m  c o u n t r y - s p e c i f i c  m o n e t a r y  p o l i c i e s .  T h e y  c a p t u r e  t h e  ( n o t  e n t i r e l y  
r e a l i s t i c )  n o t i o n  t h a t  c o u n t r i e s  t a x  a n d  g i v e  s u b s i d i e s  t o  t h e i r  o w n  c i t i z e n s  
o n l y .  F o r  t h e  r e s t  o f  t h e  p a p e r ,  w e  s h a l l  e x a m i n e  o n l y  c o u n t r y - s p e c i f i c  
m o n e t a r y  p o l i c i e s .  T h i s  i s  w i t h o u t  m u c h  l o s s  o f  g e n e r a l i t y  b e c a u s e ,  f o r  f i x e d  
p m  a n d  e ,  a n y  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  m o n e t a r y  p o l i c y  c a n  b e  i m p l e m e n t e d  b y  s o m e  
e q u i v a l e n t  c o u n t r y - s p e c i f i c  m o n e t a r y  p o l i c y .  
L e t  P E g ;  a n d  l e t  a g e n t  h ' s  w e a l t h  b e  g i v e n  b y  W I "  a s  i n  e q .  ( 2 ) .  T h e n  w e  
c a n  d e f i n e  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  d e m a n d  o f  a g e n t  h  a t  t i m e  t  a s  f , ; ( p ,  w , , ) .  W e  m a y  
n o w  d e f i n e  a  W a b ' a s i a n  e q u i l i b r i u m  a s  a  p r i c e  q  =  ( p ,  p m ,  p " )  E 9  s u c h  t h a t  
L :  f h (  p ,  W h )  =  L :  w "  a n d  W h  =  P  .  w "  + p m (  / - L h  + e v
i l  
) . 8  
" E G  h E G  
N o w  l e t  9 ( w ,  / - L ,  v )  d e n o t e  t h e  s e t  o f  m o n e t a r y  c o m p e t i t i v e  e q u i l i b r i u m .  N o t e  
t h a t  t h i s  s e t  d e p e n d s  u p o n  e a c h  c o u n t r y ' s  m o n e t a r y  p o l i c y .  W e  c a n  n o w  s t a t e  
a n  i m p o r t a n t  d e f i n i t i o n .  
D e f i n i t i o n .  T h e  w - m o n e t a r y  p o l i c y  ( / - L ,  v )  i s  w - b o n a  f i d e  i f  9 ( w ,  / - L ,  v )  i s  n o t  
e m p t y .  T h e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  m o n e t a r y  p o l i c y  ( / - L ,  v )  i s  b o n a  f i d e  i f i t  i s  w - b o n a  f i d e  
f o r  s o m e  w  E X .  
W e  s h a l l  n o w  e x p l o r e  t h e  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  u n d e r  w h i c h  a n  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
m o n e t a r y  p o l i c y  i s  c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  w o r l d  e n d o w m e n t s  g i v e n  b y  a n y  f i x e d  w .  I n  
t h i s  a n a l y s i s ,  w e  s h a l l  t a k e  a d v a n t a g e  o f  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  m o r e  t h a n  o n e  
m o n e y  i n  t h i s  m o d e l .  T h e  d i s c u s s i o n  b e l o w  s e r v e s  a s  a  g o o d  e x a m p l e  o f  h o w  
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  m o n e t a r y  e c o n o m i c s  o f t e n  p e r m i t s  a  g r e a t e r  l a t i t u d e  o f  a n a l y s i s  
t h a n  t h e  c l o s e d  e c o n o m y  m o n e t a r y  e c o n o m i c s  d o e s .  
L e t  P E g ;  a n d  c o n s i d e r  t h e  s e q u e n c e  o f  i n c o m e s  f o r  t h e  a g e n t s  i n  t h e  
e c o n o m y  g i v e n  b y  W  =  ( W " l l '  w { 3 n '  W " l '  w
f 3 I  
'  . . .  ) .  A g a i n ,  w e  s h a l l  o c c a s i o n a l l y  
w r i t e  W  =  ( W " ' ,  w ( 3 ) '  N o w  w e  d e f i n e  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  u s e f u l  c o n c e p t :  
D e f i n i t i o n .  T h e  s e q u e n c e  ( p ,  w )  i s  a  p r i c e - i n c o m e  e q u i l i b r i u m  a s s o c i a t e d  
w i t h  t o t a l  w o r l d  r e s o u r c e s  r  =  ( r  
1
,  1 ' 2 ,  . . .  )  i f  a n d  o n l y  i f  L  
h
E  G f h ( p ,  w
i l  
)  =  r .  T h e  
S N o t e  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  n o  t i m e  s u p e r s c r i p t  i n  t h i s  e q u a t i o n ;  i i / ( p ,  w , , )  i s  t h e  s e q u e n c e  
( O ,  . . .  , O , f , : ( p , W , , ) , t , : + 1  ( P , W h ) ' O ,  . . .  )  a n d  W h  i s  a n a l o g o u s .  
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m l  
iw-monetary policy (/-L, v) is consistent with the price-income equilibrium 
, is (p, w) if and only if there is some exchange rate e > 0 such that w" = p . w" + 
pm(/-Lh + eVh) with h E G1 for all t ~ O. 
ty. 
0), Now consider a given price-income equilibrium (p, w). The following 
of proposition enables us to characterize the international monetary policies 
~ly that are consistent with this equilibrium: 
:ns 
fie Proposition 6. The intemational monetmy policy (/-L, v) is consistent with the 
ed price -income equilibrium (p, w) if and only if 
ne 
_pl+l. [ I: fl:+1(P,Wh)] <pm t (/-Ls+evs)¥e 
hEGt + 1 s=oay (5)
at 
<pl+l. [ L f/+ 1(P,Wh)]. 
hEG, 
Proof. See the appendix. 
te	 Although Proposition 6 is only a simple extension of the characterization 
te	 of a bona fide monetary policy in Balasko and Shell, it is a crucial step in 
obtaining the main result of this paper. It says that the m-money equivalent 
of the world money supply must satisfy a lower and an upper bound in each 
'Jt period. This implies immediately that if a country-specific monetary policy 
le causes the world supply of real balances to be too large (or too small) at some 
finite time t, then there will never be an international monetary competitive 
equilibrium. This follows from the usual arguments using backward induc­
11	 tion. 
n Imagine, for example, that the Beta country conducts such an expansionary 
e a monetary policy that (5) is indeed violated. Then the value of n-money 
N would be zero for all time, and only m-money might serve as a store of value 
is in the world economy. Further, fix pm and consider a value of the exchange 
rate e such that, given the world monetary policy (/-L, v), eq. (5) is eventually 
e violated. Then this exchange rate represents too great a devaluation or 
y revaluation of n-money, and such an exchange rate would cause an immedi­
ate breakdown of the international monetary competitive equilibrium. This 
captures the notion of an exchange rate crisis. 
e 
4. Sustainable trade deficits 
The central question that we address in this section is the extent to which e 
monetary policies are consistent with imbalances of trade in this dynamic 
g e n e r a l  e q u i l i b r i u m .  W e  b e g i n  b y  e s t a b l i s h i n g  a  s i m p l e  r e s u l t  f o r  a  n o n m o n e ­
t a r y  w o r l d  e c o n o m y .  T h i s  i s  a n  e c o n o m y  w h e r e  ( p . "  l J )  =  0  i d e n t i c a l l y .  C o n ­
s i d e r  a  p r i c e - i n c o m e  e q u i l i b r i u m ,  a n d  l e t  u s  d e f i n e  t h e  s e q u e n c e  w "  b y  t h e  




'  . . .  ) ,  w i t h  w f 3  b e i n g  e n t i r e l y  a n a l o g o u s .  
P r o p o s i t i o n  7 .  L e t  t o t a l l y  w o r l d  r e s o u r c e s  b e  g i v e n  b y  r ,  a n d  l e t  s  E  ( 0 ,  1 ) .  T h e n  
t h e r e  i s  a  s e q u e n c e  o f  e n d o w m e n t s  w  E X  s a t i s f y i n g  L l t E G W h  =  r  a n d  a  p r i c e ­
i n c o m e  e q u i l i b r i u m  ( p ,  w )  s u c h  t h a t  s W
a  
=  w f 3 "  
P r o o f .  L e t  8 >  O .  C h o o s e  w a o  E  ~~+ a n d  ~~+ s o  t h a t  =w
f 3 0  
E  w
f 3 0  
( s / ( 1 + s » x L :
h E G o
w " ,  a n d  f o r  t~l c h o o s e  W",E[~i'+ a n d  W{3/E[~~/+ 
l i k e w i s e  s o  t h a t  w
f 3 1  
=  ( 8 / 0  +  8 » L
h E G  
w h o  W e  a r e  d e a l i n g  w i t h  a  m o d e l  o f  
o v e r l a p p i n g  g e n e r a t i o n s  i n  w h i c h  t h e r e  ~re f o u r  a g e n t s  a l i v e  i n  e a c h  p e r i o d  i n  
w h i c h  e a c h  a g e n t  h a s  s t r i c t l y  p o s i t i v e  e n d o w m e n t s  o f  a l l  g o o d s .  B a l a s k o  a n d  
S h e l l  ( 1 9 8 0 ,  p r o p o s i t i o n  3 . 1 1 )  s h o w  t h a t  a n  e q u i l i b r i u m  e x i s t s  f o r  t h i s  e c o n ­
o m y .  L e t  P E g ;  b e  a n  e q u i l i b r i u m .  R e c a l l  t h a t  w i t  =  p 1 W h  f o r  h E  G o  a n d  
w  = p t w t  + p t + l w t + l  f o r  h E  G  w i t h  t >  1  S i n c e  s w  =  W  f o r  t >  0  t h e
h h h  t  - .  " I  1 3 ,  - , 
  
r e s u l t  i s  e s t a b l i s h e d .  • 
  
T h i s  p r o p o s i t i o n  s h o w s  t h a t  w e  c a n  d i v i d e  t h e  w o r l d ' s  r e s o u r c e s  i n  s u c h  a  
m a n n e r  s o  t h a t  t h e  A l p h a s  c o m m a n d  a n  a r b i t r a r i l y  l a r g e  s h a r e  o f  t h e  
e c o n o m y ' s  i n c o m e  i n  e a c h  p e r i o d .  W e  h a v e  a l s o  e s t a b l i s h e d  t h a t  w e  c a n  
c h o o s e  a  s e q u e n c e  o f  e n d o w m e n t s  W  E X  s u c h  t h a t  t h e  W  =  ( w " ,  w ( 3 )  r e p r e ­
s e n t s  a n y  d i v i s i o n  o f  r  t h a t  w e  m i g h t  d e s i r e .  T h e  p o w e r  o f  B a l a s k o  a n d  
S h e l l ' s  ( 1 9 8 0 )  w o r k  i s  t h a t  f o r  e a c h  s u c h  W  E  X  t h e r e  i s  a n  e q u i l i b r i u m  i n  t h e  
n o n m o n e t a r y  e c o n o m y .  
W e  h a v e  n o w  d e v e l o p e d  s u f f i c i e n t l y  m a n y  i d e a s  t o  p r o v e  o u r  m a i n  r e s u l t :  
T h e o r e m .  C o n s i d e r  a n y  f i x e d  s t r e a m  o f  w o r l d  r e s o u r c e s  r .  T h e n  a  c o u n t r y  c a n  
n m  a  t r a d e  d e f i c i t  w h o s e  p r e s e n t  v a l u e  i s  a r b i t r a r i l y  c l o s e  t o  t h e  p r e s e n t  v a l u e  o f  
i t s  t r a d i n g  p a r t n e r ' s  r e s o u r c e s .  
P r o o f .  P i c k  a  p o s i t i v e  s  i n  a  n e i g h b o r h o o d  o f  z e r o .  W e  s h a l l  c o n s t r u c t  a  
b o n a  f i d e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  m o n e t a r y  p o l i c y  c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  t h e  p r i c e - i n c o m e  
e q u i l i b r i u m  ( p ,  w )  w e  d e s c r i b e d  i n  P r o p o s i t i o n  7 .  
L e t  ( p ,  w )  b e  t h i s  p r i c e - i n c o m e  e q u i l i b r i u m  a n d  l e t  e  b e  a n y  a r b i t r a r y  
p o s i t i v e  c o n s t a n t .  N o w  d e f i n e  t h e  B e t a s '  m o n e t a r y  p o l i c y  l J  b y  
l J  
O
































where again w{3, is the endowment of Ms. f3t. Define the Alphas' country­
specific monetary policy by /-Lt = - eVI for t:2: O. It is easy to check that 
L~=o(/-Ls + ev,) = 0 for t:2: O. Hence, these country-specific monetary policies 
are such that pm[L~=oC/-Ls + ev,)] = 0 for all t. This implies that this interna­
tional monetary policy is trivially bona fide for this price-income equilibrium. 
Recall that the world's stream of resources is given by r = Liz E Ow". Of 
course, the value of each Beta's consumption is equal to her income. The 
goods market equilibrium condition in each period implies that the value of 
the consumption of the Alphas can be made arbitrarily close to pt. r l , which 
is of course the present value of the entire world's resources in that period. 
This implies that the value of the Alpha country's trade deficit can be made 
arbitrarily close to plW~ in each period. • 
This theorem is true both for cases in which there is a uniform bound on 
world resources and in ones in which there is no such uniform bound. In the 
case where there is no uniform bound on world resources, the theorem 
implies that the present value of the Alpha country's trade deficit can be 
made arbitrarily large, even if the time 1 prices of goods satisfy an efficiency 
criterion. Indeed,the example presented in section 2 is exactly this kind of a 
world economy. This theorem can be interpreted as saying that in a growing 
world economy in which future goods are priced efficiently, the present 
discounted value of a country's trade deficit may not be bounded. 
The reader may feel that there is something perverse about the theorem 
because the surplus country Beta is accommodating this equilibrium by 
punishing itself with monetary contractions. But this is exactly the role that a 
devaluation plays in international finance. To see this, fix total world re­
sources r and the international monetary policy (fL, v) and then consider a 
devaluation of m-money. For a fixed m-money price pill, this implies that e 
rises or equivalently that p" rises. If (/-L, v) is w-bona fide for both the 
original and new exchange rates, then the devaluation of m-money is an 
expansion of the share of the increase in the world supply of real balances 
accruing to each citizen of the Beta country. This is precisely how a devalua­
tion 'improves' the trade balance of the Alpha country. The exact effect that 
such a devaluation will have on the entire pattern of trade is difficult to 
determine at this level of generality. It will depend upon the profile of 
. .
e n d o w m e n t s ,  t h e  p a t t e r n  o f  p r e f e r e n c e s ,  a n d  b o t h  c o u n t r y - s p e c i f i c  m o n e t a r y  
p o l i c i e s .  
W e  t o o k  a d v a n t a g e  o f  a  v e r y  i m p o r t a n t  f a c t  i n  t h e  p r o o f  o f  t h e  t h e o r e m .  I n  
m o d e l s  o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  f i n a n c e  i t  i s  a l w a y s  p o s s i b l e  t o  c o n s t r u c t  n o n t r i v i a l  
m o n e t a r y  p o l i c i e s  g i v i n g  r i s e  t o  e q u i l i b r i a  i n  w h i c h  t h e  p r i c e s  o f  a l l  m o n e y s  
a r e  n o t  z e r o .  T h i s  i s  n o t  t r u e  i n  a  c l o s e d  e c o n o m y  i n  w h i c h  t h e r e  i s  a  s i n g l e  
a g e n t  b o r n  i n  e a c h  p e r i o d .  T h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  t w o  a g e n t s  b o r n  i n  e a c h  
p e r i o d  a l l o w s  u s  t o  d e s i g n  m o n e t a r y  p o l i c i e s  t h a t  a r e  t r i v i a l l y  b o n a  f i d e  f o r  
a n y  a g g r e g a t e  p r i c e - i n c o m e  e q u i l i b r i u m .  T h e s e  p o l i c i e s  w i l l  a l w a y s  h a v e  r e a l  
e f f e c t s  i n  t h e  t r a n s f e r  o f  r e s o u r c e s  b e t w e e n  t h e  a g e n t s  o f  o n e  g e n e r a t i o n ,  
e v e n  i f  t h e r e  i s  a b s o l u t e l y  n o  r o l e  o t h e r w i s e  f o r  m o n e y  a s  a  s t o r e  o f  v a l u e .  
T h e  s t r u c t u r e  o f  t h e s e  a r g u m e n t s  c a n  o b v i o u s l y  b e  e x t e n d e d  t o  a n  n - c o u n ­
t r y  w o r l d  . w h e r e  n  >  2 .  W e  n o t e  i n  p a s s i n g  t h a t  a n y  p e r f e c t - f o r e s i g h t  i n t e r n a ­
t i o n a l  m o n e t a r y  e q u i l i b r i u m  w i l l  h a v e  a l l  b i l a t e r a l  e x c h a n g e  r a t e s  f i x e d ,  a n d  
w e  s t a t e  a  s i m p l e  c o r o l l a r y  o f  t h e  t h e o r e m .  
C o r o l l a / Y o  C o n s i d e r  a n  n - c o u n t r y  w o r l d  i n  w h i c h  e a c h  c o u n t r y  c a n  i s s u e  f i a t  
m o n e y  a n d  a n y  f i x e d  e n d o w m e n t  w  E  S  s a t i s f y i n g  " [ , 1 1  E  G W "  =  r ,  w h e r e  e a c h  G ,  
i s  n o w  a  s e t  c o n s i s t i n g  o f  n  e l e m e n t s .  T h e n  a n y  d i v i s i o n  o f  r  t h a t  h o l d s  e a c h  
g e n e r a t i o n ' s  a g g r e g a t e  r e s o u r c e s  f i x e d  c a n  b e  i m p l e m e n t e d  b y  s o m e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
m o n e t m y  p o l i c y .  
P r o o f .  T h i s  f o l l o w s  f r o m  a  c o n s t r u c t i o n  a n a l o g o u s  t o  t h a t  i n  t h e  t h e o r e m .  
. .  
5 .  C o n c l u s i o n  
T h i s  p a p e r  h a s  s h o w n  t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  g e n e r a l  c o n d i t i o n s  u n d e r  w h i c h  
m o n e t a r y  e q u i l i b r i a  g i v e  r i s e  t o  a r b i t r a r i l y  l a r g e  i m b a l a n c e s  o f  t r a d e .  B y  
a l l o w i n g  f o r  t h e  u s e  o f  t w o  m o n e y s  a s  s t o r e s  o f  v a l u e ,  i t  s h o w e d  t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  
a l w a y s  n o n t r i v i a l  m o n e t a r y  e q u i l i b r i a  f o r  a n y  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  e c o n o m y .  I t  c o n ­
f i r m e d  i n  a  g e n e r a l  s e t t i n g  e a r l i e r  w o r k  t h a t  h a d  e s t a b l i s h e d  t h a t  t h e  
e x c h a n g e  r a t e  i s  c o n s t a n t  i n  a  p e r f e c t - f o r e s i g h t  e q u i l i b r i u m .  W e  e m p h a s i z e d  
t h r o u g h o u t  t h e  d i s c u s s i o n  t h e  d i s t i n c t i o n  b e t w e e n  t h e  r o l e s  m o n e y  p l a y s  i n  
. a f f e c t i n g  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  a n d  i n t e r g e n e r a t i o n a l  t r a n s f e r s  o f  r e s o u r c e s .  F i n a l l y ,  
w e  w o u l d  b e  r e m i s s  n o t  t o  m e n t i o n  t h a t  t h e  a n a l y s i s  o f  b o n a  f i d e  i n t e r n a ­
t i o n a l  m o n e t a r y  p o l i c i e s  g i v e s  r i s e  n a t u r a l l y  t o  t h e  s t u d y  o f  t h e  s e t  r e a l  
e x c h a n g e  r a t e s  c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  t h e  m o n e t a r y  p o l i c y  ( f L ,  I I ) .  T h i s  i s  a n  a v e n u e  
o f  r e s e a r c h  t h a t  w e  h o p e  t o  p u r s u e  i n  t h e  n e a r  f u t u r e .  
A p p e n d i x  
P r o p o s i t i o n  6 .  T h e  m o n e t a r y  p o l i c y  ( f L ,  I I )  i s  c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  t h e  p r i c e - i n c o m e  
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Proof· (This proof is an	 extension of that given by BaIasko and Shell fOf
their Proposition 5.5.) Consider the equations 
n
lII	 L, f,;(P,Wh) + L, R(p,wh) =r , 




II	 L, f,:+J(p,wh ) + L, f,;+I(p,W,,) =rl+1,
I, heG, heG'+1 
I"	 Let us create the inner products of the first equation with pI, the second 
equation with p2, and so on; this sum is well defined because we are 
considering only finitely many such equations. We obtain 
t L, wh - Ii::,lps'r s= _pl+l. [ L, f,;+I(p,W,,)] 
s = 0 " eO., s = 1	 hE 0., + I 
1 
andI 
t L, W,,- tp·\·.rs=pl+l.[r l+l _ L, f,~+l(p,w,,)] 
;,=0 heG" s=l	 heG'+1 
=pl+l,[ L, f,;+I(p,w,,)). 
heG, 
This allows us to replace the expressions in (5) by 
t I 
< L, L, W,,- L,ps·rs. (5') 
s=O hEGs s=l 
We shall construct a sequence of endowments W = (wan' w{3o' W al' WPI ' •• ,) 
such that q = (p, pm, pn)	 is an international monetary competitive equilib­
rium associated with (w,}.L, V), 
Let t = O. Then the expression (5') states that 
L, w" - pl. r l <pm(}.La + eVa) < L, W", 
heGo hEGn 
w h i c h  i s  e q u i v a l e n t  t o  
s e ,  
O < p m ( p , o + e v o ) - L :  w / z + p l . , . I < p l · r
l  
.  
h E G O  
S i n c e  
L :  W h  =  L :  p l .  W~ + p m  L :  ( J . L / z  +  e v / z )  ,  




h E G o  
t h i s  e x p r e s s i o n  i s  e q u i v a l e n t  t o  





+ p l  ' r  
1  
< p l . r l .  
W h l  
N o '
B u t  
p 2 .  




b y  t h e  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  t h e  a g g r e g a t e  s u p p l y  o f  m - m o n e y  a n d  n - m o n e y .  T h i s  
i m p l i e s  t h a t  ( 5 ' )  i s  e q u i v a l e n t  t o  
1
o < p l .  [ r
l
- E  w I , ]  < p l .  r •  
h E G
o  
S i n c e  1 ' 1  E  [~~+ a n d  p l  >  0 ,  w e  c a n  c e r t a i n l y  c h o o s e  w~o E  IR~+ a n d  w b o  E  
l
IR~+ s u c h  t h a t  0  < p l  .  [w~o +  w b o J  < p l . r .  P i c k  s u c h  w h  f o r  h  E  G o  a n d  t h e n  
T h i 1
c h o o s e  W h  E  [~~+ f o r  h  E  G  1  s u c h  t h a t  
\ \  
f o r .  
L :  w } ,  +  L :  w } ,  =  , . 1 .  
f o r ,  
h E G
O  
h E G ]  
s y s t t  
N o w ,  f o r  e a c h  h E  G i l  w e  n e e d  t o  d e t e r m i n e  w f .  E  IR~+ s u c h  t h a t  p i  .  w i ,  +  
p2·w~=w,,-pm(J.Lh+evh) a n d  L h E G J w 7 , < r 2 .  S u m m i n g  o v e r  h E G
I  
,  w e  
----"





= L Wh-pm L (P-h+eVh)-pl.[r l - L wI,] 
heGI heGI heGl) 
= L Wh- P I1l L (P-h+evh)-pl'r l 
heGj heGI 
+ L w,,-pln L (P-h+evh) 
heGl) heGl) 
I 
L w,,+ I: Wh-pl'rl_pmL(p-s+evJ, 
lzeGl) heGI s=o 
where we have again used the definition of the aggregate money supplies. 
Now there are two such wr, E IR~+ for hE G j if and only if 0 < p2'[LheGlw~] <p2· r 2. Hence, 
I 
0< L wh+ L wh-pl'rl_plll L (P- s+ evJ <p2· r2, 
heGl) heGI s=O 
which is equivalent to 
1 j
I: L Wh-pl'rl_p2'r2<pmL(p-s+evs) 
s=O heG, s=O 
1 
< L L w,,-pl·r 1• 
s=O"eG, 
This corresponds to (5') for t = 1. 
We now proceed by induction. We assume that we have determined all w~ 
for h E G for s = 0, ... , t - 1. This means that we can assume that both w~,s 
for h E Gt are determined if and only if (5') holds for t - 1. The logic of the 
system of equations leading to (5') implies that 
I-I 1-1 [1-1 }
pl. L w~ = - L I: w" + I: pS. rS + pm I: (P-s + ev.) . [ ]h e G, s =0 h e G, s = 1 s = 0 
i 
f 
T h e r e f o r e  w e  n e e d  t o  f i n d  w i / I E  [R~+ f o r  h  E G
I  
s u c h  t h a t  e a c h  w~+ 1  
l l 1
s a t i s f i e s  w  = p t .  W i  + p t + 1  .  d +  
1  
+  I / .  f o r  h E  G  w i t h  E  w +
1  
<  r  +
! J  h h  h r - h  I '  h E G , h  .  
A g a i n  s u m m i n g  o v e r  h E  G
p  
w e  s e e  t h a t  t h e s e  t w o  e q u a l i t i e s  a r e  e q u i v a l e n t  
t o  
p l + l . [  E  W i / I ]  = [ E  w , , +  [ p s . / " s + p m [ ' t ( / L s + e v
s
) ] .  
/ t e G ,  s = O  h E G ,  s = 1  s = O  
,




i f  a n d  o n l y  i f  O < p l + l .  [ E  w +
1
] < p l + I . " I + l
" h  E G
,  
h ,  
w h i c h  i s  a g a i n  e a s i l y  t r a n s f o r m e d  i n t o  
1 I  
0 <  E  L  W h - E p l . " l _ p ' "  E ( f J - s +  
e v
s
)  < p l + l . / " I + I .  
s = O  h E G ,  s = 1  s = O  
T h i s  i s  e q u i v a l e n t  t o  ( 5 ' )  f o r  t >  1 .  
•  
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